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ALL BUT THE RAREST OF CHILDREN: MILLER AND 
MONTGOMERY’S IMPLICIT BAN ON VICTIM AND 
COMMUNITY IMPACT TESTIMONY IN JUVENILE LIFE 







Children are less responsible than adults. It seems superfluous to say 
and unnecessary to question. But the seemingly simple distinction between 
the culpability of adults and that of juveniles has been the subject of 
significant debate in criminal sentencing jurisprudence over the last few 
decades.  
Although the idea that juveniles and adults are qualitatively different 
originated in the sixteenth century, this concept didn’t make its way into the 
American criminal justice system until 1899 when the first juvenile court 
was created in the United States.1 Our modern, formalized juvenile court 
system was developed in the 1960s.2  
In the 1970s and 1980s, rising rates of violent crime resulted in an 
increase in the practice of trying juveniles in adult court and incarcerating 
them in adult prisons.3 As crime rates have steadily declined over the last 
two decades, the criminal justice system has been sluggishly returning to 
the days of juvenile justice reform, devoting attention once again to the 
 
*  J.D. Candidate (2020), Washington University in St. Louis. 
1.  See Juvenile Justice History, CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST., 
http://www.cjcj.org/education1/juvenile-justice-history.html [https://perma.cc/B9AB-XZVV]. 
2.  Id. (“In the 1960s, the Supreme Court made a series of decisions that formalized the juvenile 
courts and introduce[d] more due process protections such as right to counsel. Formal hearings were 
required in situations where youth faced transfer to adult court and or a period of long-term institutional 
confinement.”). 
3.  See Nicole Scialabba, Should Juveniles Be Charged as Adults in the Criminal Justice System?, 
A.B.A. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrens-
rights/articles/2016/should-juveniles-be-charged-as-adults/ [https://perma.cc/59HH-YCZX]. 
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differences between juveniles and adults, and the need to treat them 
differently, especially when it comes to sentencing.4  
One of the greatest areas of controversy in juvenile sentencing reform 
has been in the context of first-degree murder. The death penalty was an 
available punishment for juveniles older than fourteen until 1988.5 And it 
wasn’t until 2005 that the death penalty was outlawed for all juveniles.6 The 
focus of this line of cases was the distinctive differences in the maturity and 
culpability of children and adults, and the impact those differences should 
have on sentencing.  
Modern juvenile sentencing reform reached a new height in 2012, when 
the Supreme Court, in Miller v. Alabama, held that mandatory sentences of 
life without parole for juveniles are unconstitutional.7 The significant and 
well-known differences in the maturity and decision-making ability of 
juveniles and adults and the resulting difference in culpability must now be 
taken into consideration before courts assign a juvenile life without parole 
(JLWOP) sentence.8  
Then, in 2016, the Court in Montgomery v. Louisiana held that Miller 
applies retroactively and that states must allow applicable offenders 
currently serving mandatory JLWOP sentences to be resentenced or 
considered for parole.9 The Court made it clear that only “the rare juvenile 
offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is 
impossible and life without parole is justified” should be given such a 
sentence.10   
States are now in the process of resentencing these individuals and 
redrafting JLWOP statutes, and a wide variety of approaches are being taken 
 
4.  See id.  
5.  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (prohibiting capital punishment for juveniles 
fourteen to sixteen years old). 
6.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
7.  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
8.  See id. at 480.  
9.  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). Making Miller retroactive creates an interesting 
dilemma, which courts must now resolve: in determining the parole eligibility of an offender who was 
sentenced to mandatory JLWOP when he was juvenile, must the court limit evidence regarding his 
potential for rehabilitation to only that which was available at the time of his trial, or may the court look 
at the individual’s life within the prison walls to make a determination? The Court didn’t directly address 
this issue in Montgomery, and states vary in their methods. For the most part, this Note will focus on 
post-Montgomery crimes, but the same issues potentially apply in both situations. 
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to achieve these ends.11 Many of these statutes contain a list of specific 
factors, aggravating and mitigating, that a court must consider when 
deciding whether to sentence an offender to JLWOP. And frequently, the 
list of factors includes victim or community impact testimony (or both).12   
Such impact testimony is the focus of this Note. Despite its frequent 
inclusion in sentencing, impact testimony contributes neither to 
individualized sentencing nor to helping a court determine whether a 
juvenile defendant is so “irretrievabl[y] deprav[ed] that rehabilitation is 
impossible.”13 Thus, although not explicitly prohibited in Miller or 
Montgomery, the use of impact testimony is violative of the Court’s 
holdings and should not be permitted during consideration of a JLWOP 
sentence. Instead, statutes governing JLWOP sentences should limit the 
factors that may be considered to those involving the defendant’s capacity 
for rehabilitation or his “irretrievable depravity,” as suggested by the Court 
in Miller and Montgomery. 
Part I of this note lays out the history of the Court’s juvenile and capital 
sentencing cases and catalogs various states’ statutory responses to Miller 
and Montgomery. Part II analyzes the Court’s holdings in these two cases 
and their implicit prohibition on victim and community impact testimony, 
as well as the attempts by states to comply with those holdings in revising 




Part I is broken into five sections: Section A traces the Court’s 
preliminary decisions regarding juvenile sentencing that the Miller court 
relied on; Section B discusses a series of cases requiring individualized 
sentencing in capital cases; Section C presents two cases taking opposing 
stances on the use of impact testimony in capital sentencing; Section D 
breaks down the Court’s reasoning in both Miller and Montgomery; and 
Section E summarizes states’ statutory responses to Miller and 
Montgomery. 
 
11.  See Locked Up for Life: 50-State Examination, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 31, 2017), 
https://www.ap.org/explore/locked-up-for-life/50-states [https://perma.cc/Q6VP-9MKX]. 
12.  The distinction between victim and community impact testimony is minimal and is largely a 
product of statutory language. I will collectively refer to both as “impact testimony.” 
13.  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733–34.  
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A. Roper and Graham: Laying the Foundation of  
Modern Juvenile Sentencing 
 
Two recent cases laid the foundation for Miller and Montgomery by 
banning entire classes of sentences for juveniles.14 The first of these, Roper 
v. Simmons, eliminated the death penalty for juveniles.15 Roper involved a 
seventeen-year-old defendant who was convicted of murder and sentenced 
to death.16 After the Supreme Court barred the death penalty for 
intellectually disabled persons in Atkins v. Virginia,17 Simmons sought 
postconviction relief on the basis that the Court’s reasoning in Atkins ought 
to apply to the same punishment for juveniles.18 In evaluating Simmons’s 
case,19 the Court implemented its longstanding Eighth Amendment 
framework which includes “referring to the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society to determine which 
punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.”20  
The Court examined state legislation and sentencing practices as 
“objective indicia” of states’ evolving views that the death penalty is an 
inappropriate punishment for juvenile offenders.21 The Court then reflected 
on “three general differences between juveniles . . . and adults” which 
demonstrate juveniles’ lessened culpability.22 The first difference is 
juveniles’ immaturity, which “often result[s] in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions.”23 The second difference the Court 
recognized between juveniles and adults “is that juveniles are more 
 
14.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
15.  Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
16.  Id. The defendant (Simmons) planned and committed a burglary and murder, tying his (seemingly 
random) victim up and throwing her from a railway bridge. Id. at 556–57. 
17.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
18.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 559. The death penalty had previously been disallowed for persons under the 
age of sixteen, so in effect, Roper only applied to sixteen- to eighteen-year-olds. See Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
19.  On a writ of habeas corpus, the Missouri Supreme Court agreed with Simmons’s reasoning and 
set aside his death penalty sentence in favor of life without parole. After Roper (superintendent of the 
correctional facility where Simmons was incarcerated) appealed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 559–60.   
20.  Id. at 560–561 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
21.  Id. at 564–65. 
22.  Id. at 569. These differences arise again in the subsequent juvenile sentencing cases.    
23.  Id. The Court looked to what “any parent knows” and “scientific and sociological studies,” as well 
as the fact that “almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries, 
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vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, 
including peer pressure” due to their lack of control “over their own 
environment” and inability to change their circumstances.24 Finally, the 
Court noted that “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of 
an adult” and that their personality traits “are more transitory, less fixed.”25 
The Court concluded that these differences make it clear that “it would be 
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a 
greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be 
reformed.”26 
 The Court then argued that, in light of juveniles’ reduced moral 
culpability, it is also “evident that the penological justifications for the death 
penalty apply to [juveniles] with lesser force than to adults.”27 Finally, the 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment “forbid[s] imposition” of the death 
penalty on juvenile offenders.28 
 Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court furthered its juvenile 
sentencing jurisprudence, finding that JLWOP for nonhomicide offenses 
violates the Constitution.29 In that case, the sixteen-year-old defendant 
attempted to rob a restaurant with some friends, one of whom hit the 
manager over the head with a metal bar before the group fled in a getaway 
car.30 Graham was charged as an adult and pleaded guilty to armed burglary 
with assault or battery, which was classified as a first-degree felony in 
Florida and carried a maximum sentence of life without parole.31 He was 
sentenced to three years’ probation, with a plea agreement whereby the 
court withheld formal adjudication of his guilt.32 Graham was again arrested 
for an armed burglary approximately seventeen months after the first 
offense.33 During his probation hearings, the court found Graham had 
 
24.  Id.  
25.  Id. at 570.   
26.  Id.  
27.  Id. at 571. The Court noted that retribution in the form of death is not merited given the lesser 
culpability of juveniles and that deterrence is especially ineffective for juveniles given their 
impetuousness. Id. at 571–72.  
28.  Id. at 578. 
29.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  
30.  Id. at 53. 
31.  Id. at 53–54. Graham also pleaded guilty to attempted armed robbery. 
32.  Id. at 54.   
33.  See id. at 53–54. Graham attempted to flee from the police but crashed into a pole. Id. at 54–55. 
The police then found firearms in Graham’s vehicle. Id. at 55. Both facts constituted probation 
violations. Id. 
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violated the terms of his probation, and he was thus formally convicted and 
sentenced for the prior offenses.34 Sentencing recommendations ranged 
from four to forty-five years, but the court, after lamenting over Graham’s 
choice to throw his “life away” despite having “a lot of people who wanted 
to try and help” him, sentenced him to life imprisonment.35  
 The Supreme Court evaluated Graham’s Eighth Amendment challenge 
with much of the same reasoning it used in Roper,36 determining that a 
categorical ban on JLWOP sentences for nonhomicide crimes fits better 
within the scope of prior categorical bans on the death penalty37 than with 
traditional proportionality cases that consider the particular defendant’s 
crime on a case-by-case basis.38 Thus, the Court applied the same 
categorical test used in Roper, considering the “objective indicia of 
society’s standards . . . to determine whether there is a national consensus 
against the sentencing practice at issue”39 and “the standards elaborated by 
controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and 
interpretation” of the Eighth Amendment.40 The Court determined that 
although state and federal legislation did not indicate a national consensus 
against JLWOP for nonhomicide offenses,41 actual sentencing practices 
did.42 
 
34.  Id. at 55–57. 
35.  Id. at 56–58. Because Florida had no parole program at the time, Graham’s life sentence amounted 
to life without parole. Id. at 57. Before the case reached the Supreme Court, a Florida appellate court 
determined that Graham was “incapable of rehabilitation” and upheld his sentence. Id. at 58. 
36.  See id. at 58–62. 
37.  Id. at 61–62. The “categorical ban on the death penalty” cases the Court references include bans 
on classes of defendants and classes of crimes. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (rape of 
a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(intellectually disabled persons).  
38.  See Graham, 560 U.S. at 59–60 (2010) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) 
(upholding life without parole for cocaine possession)). The test applied in these cases is two-pronged: 
courts must “begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence,” and if the 
sentence is found grossly disproportionate (which should be rare), courts “should then compare the 
defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with 
sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdiction.” Id. at 60. Only if this process supports the 
initial finding of disproportionality will the sentence be considered cruel and unusual. Id. 
39.  Id. at 61 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 563). 
40.  Id. (citing Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421). 
41.  Id. at 62. Thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and federal law allowed the practice at the 
time. Id.  
42.  Id. The Court found that, at the time, there were only 124 juveniles serving life without parole for 
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 The Court then evaluated the culpability of juvenile offenders convicted 
of nonhomicide crimes, referring to the characteristics distinguishing 
juveniles from adults first laid out in Roper.43 The Court concluded that 
“when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill 
or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”44 Next, the Court 
compared the severity of life without parole to that of the death penalty,45 
especially when given to juvenile offenders.46 Finally, the Court analyzed 
the sentence in light of penological justifications,47 echoing its prior 
decision in Roper: “With respect to life without parole for juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders, none of the goals of penal sanctions that have been 
recognized as legitimate . . . provides an adequate justification.”48  
After holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids JLWOP for 
nonhomicide offenders, the Court advised states that they are “not required 
to guarantee eventual freedom” to such offenders but must “give defendants 
like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”49   
 
B. Woodson and Its Offspring: Requiring Individualized 
Sentencing for Capital Punishment 
 
Graham’s “treatment of juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital 
punishment” draws into the discussion a line of cases in which the Court 
invalidated mandatory death penalty sentences and instead required 
 
43.  See id. at 68 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70). 
44.  Id. at 69.  
45.  Id. (“It is true that a death sentence is unique in its severity and irrevocability; yet life without 
parole sentences share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other sentences.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
46.  Id. at 70. (“Life without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile. Under this 
sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in 
prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole 
receive the same punishment in name only.”)  
47.  See id. at 71–75.   
48.  Id. at 71. The Court stated that “[a] life without parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile 
offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity” and that “[t]he penalty forswears altogether the 
rehabilitative ideal.” Id. at 73–74.  
49.  Id. at 75. The Court qualified its holding by reassuring states that “those who commit truly 
horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for 
the duration of their lives” and that the Eighth Amendment only prohibits states “from making the 
judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.” Id. 
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individualized sentencing for capital offenders.50 The first of those cases, 
Woodson v. North Carolina, held that a mandatory death sentence for first-
degree murder violates the Eighth Amendment.51 The Court stated that “in 
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth 
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the 
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of 
death.”52 
Two years later, the Court specified in Lockett v. Ohio that in capital 
cases, the sentencer must consider “any aspect of a defendant's character or 
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”53 Although Lockett did 
not enumerate specific mitigating factors that must be considered in every 
case, it did point to “[t]he absence of direct proof that the defendant intended 
to cause the death of the victim,” “a defendant's comparatively minor role 
in the offense,” and “age” as examples of factors the Ohio statute in question 
failed to take into account, thus violating Woodson.54  
Then, in Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Court evaluated the case of a 
sixteen-year-old charged with the murder of a police officer.55 The Court 
vacated Eddings’s death sentence because the trial court failed to consider 
his offered mitigating evidence, including his problematic family 
background and delayed mental and emotional development.56 The Court 
explained its reasoning:  
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a 
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a 
chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a 
person may be most susceptible to influence and to 
psychological damage . . . Even the normal 16-year-old 
 
50.  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 475 (2012). The Court added, “Of special pertinence here, we 
insisted in these rulings that a sentence have the ability to consider the mitigating qualities of youth. 
Everything we said in Roper and Graham about that stage of life also appears in these decisions.” Id. at 
476 (citation omitted).  
51.  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
52.  Id. at 304 (citation omitted). 
53.  Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).  
54.  Id. at 608. 
55.  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).  
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customarily lacks the maturity of an adult. In this case, 
Eddings was not a normal 16-year-old; he had been 
deprived of the care, concern, and paternal attention that 
children deserve. On the contrary, it is not disputed that he 
was a juvenile with serious emotional problems, and had 
been raised in a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family 
background. In addition, there was testimony that Eddings’ 
mental and emotional development were at a level several 
years below his chronological age. All of this does not 
suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of 
murder, deliberately committed in this case. Rather, it is to 
say that just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a 
relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the 
background and mental and emotional development of a 
youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing.57 
The Court made clear in this line of cases that the sentencer must take into 
account mitigating factors such as “an offender’s age and the wealth and 
characteristics and circumstances attendant to it” before condemning that 
offender to the harshest penalty available to him.58  
Finally, in Zant v. Stephens, the Court further clarified the constitutional 
requirements of capital sentencing schemes by examining the flip side of 
the individualized sentencing coin: aggravating factors.59 The Court 
announced that one fundamental requirement of capital sentencing statutes 
is that “aggravating circumstances must genuinely narrow the class of 
persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the 
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others 
 
57.  Id. at 115–16.  
58.  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476 (2012). The Miller Court also quoted from Johnson v. Texas, 
509 U.S. 350 (1993), a case that upheld a defendant’s conviction despite the jury not being instructed 
that it must consider the nineteen-year-old defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor. The Court in 
Johnson acknowledged that “[t]here is no dispute that a defendant's youth is a relevant mitigating 
circumstance that must be within the effective reach of a capital sentencing jury” but found that there 
was no “reasonable likelihood” the jury did not consider the defendant’s youth because his father 
testified on his behalf and spoke specifically to his immaturity. Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367–68. Of special 
relevance to the Miller Court was the Johnson Court’s explanation that “[t]he relevance of youth as a 
mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals 
mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.” Id. at 
368. 
59.  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).  
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found guilty of murder.”60 A statute with vague or overly broad aggravating 
factors leads to “arbitrary and capricious sentencing” and is thus 
disproportionate and unconstitutional.61  
 
C. Booth and Payne: The Introduction of Victim  
Impact Testimony in Capital Sentencing Hearings 
 
In 1987, the Court held in Maryland v. Booth that victim impact 
testimony “is irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision, and that its 
admission creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may 
impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner,” the very 
consequence the Court sought to avoid in its mandatory individualized 
sentencing cases.62  
The Court was concerned with the possibility that victims who were 
especially likeable or whose families were more articulate in expressing 
their grief would effect harsher punishment than would a victim of “more 
questionable character,” resulting in arbitrary sentencing.63  
The Court acknowledged that it “has never said that the defendant's 
record, characteristics, and the circumstances of the crime are the only 
permissible sentencing considerations” but maintained that “a state statute 
that requires consideration of other factors must be scrutinized to ensure that 
the evidence has some bearing on the defendant's personal responsibility 
and moral guilt.”64  
However, only four years later, the Court reversed Booth in Payne v. 
Tennessee.65 In that case, the Court argued that the use of victim impact 
testimony in capital sentencing falls well within states’ rights to determine 
their own sentencing procedures, and that “victim impact evidence is simply 
another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the 
 
60.  Id. at 877. 
61.  Id. The aggravators upheld in this case were the defendant’s prior record of conviction for a capital 
felony and that the defendant’s escape from lawful confinement. Id. at 879. The Court found that these 
factors “adequately differentiate this case in an objective, evenhanded, and substantively rational way 
from the many Georgia murder cases in which the death penalty may not be imposed.” Id.  
62.  See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502–03 (1987). 
63.  Id. at 505–06.  
64.  Id. at 502.  
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specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a general type 
long considered by sentencing authorities.”66  
Furthermore, the Court stated that “[i]n the majority of cases . . . victim 
impact evidence serves entirely legitimate purposes” and that the possibility 
of undue prejudice or unfairness the Booth Court foresaw could be curbed 
by the safety net of the Fourteenth Amendment.67 Finally, the Court 
reasoned that if the sentencer is required to view the defendant as an 
individual, it would be unfair to not grant the same treatment to the victim 
and that only in doing so could the sentencer be given all the information 
necessary to make a sentencing decision.68   
Since Payne was decided, victim impact testimony has routinely been a 
component of sentencing, whether the victims appear in court or their 
written statements are included in presentencing reports.69 Following the 
Court’s directive, many states now have victims’ rights provisions that 
mandate an opportunity for victims to testify at trial.70 
 
D. Miller and Montgomery: Banning Mandatory JLWOP 
 
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court merged its juvenile sentencing and 
individualized sentencing reasoning to categorically ban mandatory 
JLWOP.71 The Court reviewed Miller and its companion case, Jackson v. 
Hobbs. Both cases involved fourteen-year-old defendants—Miller in 
Alabama and Jackson in Arkansas—charged with murder and given 
mandatory sentences of life without parole.72  
Jackson and two friends decided to rob a video store; on the way, he 
discovered one of his friends was carrying a gun.73 He initially elected to 
wait outside the store, but later went inside and found his weapon-toting 
 
66.  Id. at 825.  
67.  Id. 
68.  See id. (“Booth deprives the State of the full moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury 
from having before it all the information necessary to determine the proper punishment for a first-degree 
murder.”). 
69.  See Susan A. Bandes, What Are Victim-Impact Statements For?, ATLANTIC (July 23, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/what-are-victim-impact-statements-for/492443/ 
[https://perma.cc/7CGK-TTKS]. 
70.  Issues: Constitutional Amendments, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
https://victimsofcrime.org/our-programs/public-policy/amendments [https://perma.cc/R5FD-UPCW]. 
71.  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).  
72.  Id. at 465. 
73.  Id. 
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friend pointing the gun at the clerk, demanding money.74 Jackson’s friend 
shot and killed the clerk, and Jackson was convicted of felony murder and 
aggravated robbery.75  
Miller and a friend were drinking and smoking marijuana with a drug-
dealing neighbor and decided to rob the dealer after he passed out.76 The 
dealer woke up and an altercation ensued, ending with Miller hitting the 
dealer repeatedly with a baseball bat and leaving him unconscious.77 The 
boys lit two fires to cover up their crime, and the dealer died as a result.78 
Miller was convicted of murder in the course of arson.79  
 The Court noted that Miller “implicate[s] two strands of precedent.”80 
The first strand is the categorical ban on sentences that reflect a 
disproportionality between the culpability of the offender and the severity 
of the penalty; this is the strand that Graham and Roper hinged upon.81 The 
Court considered the three Roper characteristics which make juveniles less 
morally culpable than adults82 and the insufficiency of the penological 
justifications when applied to juveniles.83 The Court in Miller stated that 
because “none of what [Graham] said about children . . . is crime-specific . 
. . its reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on a 
juvenile.”84 The Court argued that a mandatory sentence, by its nature, 
precludes the sentencer from considering the “distinctive attributes of 
youth,” among other things, and thus “prohibit[s] a sentencing authority 
from assessing whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment 
proportionately punishes a juvenile offender. That contravenes Graham’s 
(and also Roper’s) foundational principle: that the imposition of a State’s 
most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they 
were not children.”85 
 
74.  Id.  
75.  Id. at 466. 
76.  Id. at 468. The dealer showed up to Miller’s house to sell drugs to Miller’s mother. Id. Miller and 
his friend then went with the dealer back to his trailer next door. Id. 
77.  Id.  
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. at 469.  
80.  Id. at 470.  
81.  See id.  
82.  Id. at 471. The Miller Court calls them “the distinctive attributes of youth.” Id. at 472.  
83.  See id. at 472–73.  
84.  Id. at 473.  
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The second strand of precedent is made up of those previously 
mentioned cases that prohibit mandatory forms of capital punishment, 
which don’t allow the sentencer to consider the circumstances of the 
individual defendant and the crime committed.86 Just as it did in Graham, 
the Court again compared JLWOP to a death sentence, pointing out the 
disproportionality of time served on a life without parole sentence for a 
juvenile versus the time served on the same sentence for an adult.87 And just 
as the Court’s precedent requires the sentencer to consider mitigating factors 
before sentencing a defendant to death, the Court insisted on the same 
consideration for juveniles being sentenced to life without parole: 
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes 
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark 
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and 
failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents 
taking into account the family and home environment that 
surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually 
extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. 
It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, 
including the extent of his participation in the conduct and 
the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. 
Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and 
convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies 
associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal 
with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea 
agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. 
And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the 
possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances 
most suggest it.88 
 The Court then applied these considerations to the cases in front of it, 
finding both Miller and Jackson had reduced culpability in light of the 
 
86.  See id. at 475–76. The Court cites Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), noting that “Eddings is 
especially on point” due to the defendant’s age. Miller, 567 U.S. at 476. 
87.  See Miller, 567 U.S. at 474–75 (“In part because we viewed this ultimate penalty for juveniles as 
akin to the death penalty [in Graham], we treated it similarly to that most severe punishment. We 
imposed a categorical ban.”).  
88.  Id. at 477–78.  
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circumstances of their crimes and their difficult family backgrounds and 
upbringings.89 While the Court ultimately declined to impose an absolute 
categorical ban on JLWOP, it warned that “we think appropriate occasions 
for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be 
uncommon” and suggested such a sentence would only be appropriate for 
“the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”90  
 After Miller, states began revising their criminal codes to align with the 
Court’s decision,91 and there was much discussion about whether the ban on 
mandatory JLWOP applied retroactively to those already serving time for 
crimes committed while they were juveniles.92 The Court settled the matter 
in Montgomery when it held that the prohibition on mandatory JLWOP was 
a new substantive rule and did, in fact, apply retroactively.93  
The Court reassured states that complying with Miller need not be 
overly burdensome and that “[g]iving Miller retroactive effect . . . does not 
require States to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions . . . . A State may 
remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be 
considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”94 
 Montgomery also attempted to assist states by providing some 
clarification of which offenders Miller applied to: “Those prisoners who 
have shown an inability to reform will continue to serve life sentences. The 
opportunity for release will be afforded to those who demonstrate the truth 
of Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit even heinous 
crimes are capable of change.”95 The Court warned, however, that mere 
 
89.  See id. at 478–79.  
90.  Id. at 479–80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 68 (2010)). The dissent considered this warning a “gratuitous prediction” which “appears to be 
nothing other than an invitation to overturn life without parole sentences imposed by juries and trial 
judges” as a means of making them uncommon, at which time “the Court will have bootstrapped its way 
to declaring that the Eighth Amendment absolutely prohibits them.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 501 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting).  
91.  See Kimberly Thomas, Random if Not “Rare”? The Eighth Amendment Weaknesses of Post-
Miller Legislation, 68 S.C. L. REV. 393 (2017). 
92.  See Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State Responses, the 
Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban on Life Without Parole for Juveniles 
Is the Only Constitutional Option, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149 (2017).  
93.  See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).  
94.  Id. The Court added, “Allowing those offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles 
whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to 
serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. 
95.  Id. Additionally, the Court stated that Miller permitted life without parole for only “those whose 
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cursory consideration of age isn’t sufficient to satisfy Miller; a JLWOP 
sentence “still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime 
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity.”96 
 
E. Statutory Provisions 
 
 In light of both Miller and Montgomery, states have continued to revise 
their criminal statutes to comport with the Court’s decisions, and have 
begun the process of resentencing or making eligible for parole those 
offenders who were sentenced— decades ago for many—to mandatory life 
without parole as juveniles.97 States have taken a variety of approaches in 
drafting their statutes. Of the twenty-eight states that had JLWOP at the time 
Miller was decided, seven have since eliminated the punishment 
altogether.98 Most states that have kept the punishment simply reworked 
their traditional capital sentencing statutes to create separate sentencing 
procedures for juveniles and adults,99 but some created a separate statute 
specifically for JLWOP.100 At least five states have drafted statutes that 
make JLWOP discretionary but do not provide specific aggravating or 
mitigating factors that must be considered.101 Three states have not yet 
redrafted their general life without parole statutes, which currently reflect 
no distinction between life without parole for adults and juveniles and 
therefore violate Miller.102 Of the states that do provide statutory guidance 
for mitigating or aggravating factors that should be considered, eight of 
them explicitly allow or mandate the consideration of impact testimony.103   
 
96.  Id. at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
97.  See John R. Mills, Anna M. Dorn & Amelia Courtney Hritz, Juvenile Life Without Parole in Law 
and Practice: Chronicling the Rapid Change Underway, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 552-53 (2016). This 
article analyzes the legislative responses to Miller and Montgomery and sentencing data from states’ 
departments of corrections. The authors note multiple disparities in pre-Miller JLWOP practices, 
including racial and geographical disproportionalities. See id.; see also ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 
11 (containing a multistate survey of statutory re-drafting and offender resentencing attempts). 
98.  See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 11 (Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, South 
Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming). 
99.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(A) (2019). 
100.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209A (2019). 
101.  See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 11 (Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Ohio). 
102.  See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 11 (Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia). 
103.  See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 26.3 (LexisNexis 2018)(court decides between life without parole and life 
with minimum of thirty years, after considering presentence report which “may contain . . . Victim 
Impact Statements”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-752 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 921.1401 (2019) (“[T]he court 
shall consider factors relevant to the offense and the defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances, 












The reasoning that culminated in the Miller and Montgomery decisions 
can be traced through decades of capital and juvenile sentencing 
jurisprudence. This same line of reasoning also leads to the conclusion that 
any sentencing considerations that do not focus primarily on the defendant 
and his capacity for rehabilitation—such as community and victim 
impact104—have no place in JLWOP sentencing. 
To be sure, neither Miller nor Montgomery expressly limits sentencing 
considerations to only those which are defendant-focused, nor do they 
expressly prohibit impact testimony. However, the Court makes clear that 
the only evidence that matters in sentencing an offender to JLWOP is that 
which concerns his capacity for rehabilitation.  
For example, in Montgomery, the Court asserts that a JLWOP sentence 
“still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects 
‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.’”105 Additionally, the Court insists 
that only “the rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable 
depravity that rehabilitation is impossible and life without parole is 
justified” can be sentenced to JLWOP.106  
Thus, if there is any evidence that the offender could mature or be 
rehabilitated over time—and the Court points out that “all but the rarest of 
children”107 is capable of such growth—a JLWOP sentence is 
disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional. Testimony highlighting the 
impact the offender’s crime had on the victim’s family or community does 
not contribute to any finding regarding the offender’s capacity for maturity 
or rehabilitation. Miller and Montgomery simply leave no room for the 
 
including, but not limited to . . . [t]he effect of the crime on the victim’s family and on the community.”); 
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-1(a)(8) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-115); IOWA CODE § 
902.1(2)–(3) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25 (2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.033(2)(10) (West, 
Westlaw through 2019 First Reg. Sess. and First Extraordinary Sess.); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
1102.1(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Act 75). 
104.  Many states allow for the consideration of other aggravating factors which are not necessarily 
defendant-focused. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.1401 (2019) (mandates consideration of “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense committed by the defendant” as well as victim and community impact and 
eight defendant-focused factors). This Note is limited to victim and community impact and will not 
address other often-included factors, which may or may not adhere to Miller.  
105.  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).  
106.  Id. at 733 (emphasis added). 
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consideration of victim or community impact in determining a JLWOP 
sentence.  
Although not explicitly discussed in any of the juvenile sentencing 
cases, impact testimony has been hotly debated by the Court in the capital 
sentencing context.108 The argument against its use in Booth focused on its 
potential to incite discriminatory or arbitrary sentencing, largely because it 
requires the sentencing authority to shift its focus from the defendant to the 
victim’s family member.109 However, the Court in Payne had the last word 
and argued that impact testimony serves to paint a complete picture of the 
circumstances of the crime, which should be considered equally alongside 
the individual defendant’s culpability while assigning a death sentence.110  
This would appear, at first glance, to be problematic. The holding of 
Payne unequivocally permits the use of impact evidence in capital 
sentencing, and neither the Miller nor the Montgomery Court explicitly 
prohibits them in JLWOP cases. However, Payne is directly at odds with 
the Court’s insistence on strictly defendant-centered considerations in 
Montgomery. In fact, Miller and Montgomery implicitly echo Booth’s 
concerns about impact testimony taking the sentencer’s focus away from 
the defendant.  
Also problematic is that Graham compared JLWOP to the death penalty 
due to the number of years juveniles spend in prison compared to an adult 
given a life without parole sentence.111 The comparison is apt, and the 
resulting mandate that JLWOP cases require individualized sentences 
similar to capital cases is sensible. However, the Court in Miller and 
Montgomery draws a bright line between juveniles and adults in terms of 
brain development and culpability, thereby implicitly distinguishing 
between capital and JLWOP sentencing by requiring strictly defendant-
focused sentencing for JLWOP.112  
 
108.  See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
109.  See Booth, 482 U.S. at 502–03. 
110.  See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. 
111.  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70–75 (2010). 
112.  This raises the question of whether victim or community impact testimony should be used in any 
juvenile sentencing. Although the question is beyond the scope of this Note, it should be observed that, 
while the holdings of Miller and Montgomery apply solely to JLWOP sentencing, the observations made 
by the Court regarding juvenile brain development served only to separate juveniles from adults. Nothing 
in these observations relates solely to the crime of murder. 







244           Washington University Journal of Law and Policy         [Vol. 62 
 
 
Aside from its potential to result in a disproportionate JLWOP sentence, 
impact testimony fails to serve any legitimate penological purpose.113 It’s 
clear that impact testimony has little deterrent effect on future juvenile 
offenders.114 The developmental differences115 noted by the Court in the 
juvenile sentencing cases mean that juveniles are virtually incapable of 
planning ahead or considering the consequences of their actions. In 
particular, the Court in Roper highlighted the unlikelihood that juveniles are 
susceptible to any deterrent effects due to their impetuosity.116 No impact 
testimony, no matter how passionate or sincere, will prompt a child to do 
something their brain is not yet capable of. 
Similarly, allowing impact testimony at sentencing will not serve a 
significant rehabilitative function. Although Miller and Montgomery strive 
to make rehabilitation a possibility for juvenile offenders, the same 
developmental differences that make juveniles impetuous and short-sighted 
also render them unable to fully understand the perspective of their victim’s 
family and community members.117 It is not until later in their lives, when 
their brains are fully developed, that offenders who committed crimes as 
juveniles are able to fully appreciate the harm they may have caused to the 
victim’s family or community.118 Thus, while impact testimony may be an 
important rehabilitative tool, its usefulness to that end is only realized years 
after sentencing.  
 
113.  See Niru Shanker, Getting a Grip on Payne and Restricting the Influence of Victim Impact 
Statements in Capital Sentencing: The Timothy McVeigh Case and Various State Approaches 
Compared, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 711, 734–36 (1999). 
114.  See Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime Victim: Evaluating Victim Input at Sentencing and 
Parole, 38 CRIME & JUST. 347, 354 (2009). 
115.  See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012) (listing developmental findings of “transient 
rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences”). 
116.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
117.  See Samantha Buckingham, Reducing Incarceration for Youthful Offenders with a Developmental 
Approach to Sentencing, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801 (2013). The author observes that:  
As compared to mature adults, adolescents and emerging adults are less able to 
accurately predict the impact of their behavior, exercise self-restraint, and 
maturely weigh costs and benefits. One study reveals that adolescents at age 
seventeen are less able than adults to gauge, understand, and account for the 
perspectives of others in the decision-making process. 
Id. at 835–36. 
118.  See id. There have been numerous studies regarding the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
victim impact testimony even with adult offenders. See, e.g., Shanker, supra note 113 (analyzing the use 








2020]                   Impact Testimony in Juvenile Sentencing                   245 
   
 
 
Incapacitation is, in some ways, the entire thrust of the JLWOP 
sentencing decision; the defendant has already been found guilty and the 
sentencer is only deciding between life in prison and a chance the offender 
may one day be released. However, Montgomery makes clear that the length 
of time a juvenile offender needs to be incapacitated should be based 
entirely on his capacity for rehabilitation, not outside factors like the impact 
his crime had on the victim’s family or community. The Graham court 
noted particularly that “[i]ncapacitation cannot override all other 
considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment’s rule against disproportionate 
sentences be a nullity.”119  
The penological purpose that impact testimony serves most forcefully 
is a retributive one.120 However, even retribution is imperfectly achieved in 
the juvenile-sentencing context.121 Impact testimony tends to be emotionally 
charged and often verges into hostility. The family and friends of murder 
victims likely expect their testimony about how the defendant’s actions 
affected their lives to be therapeutic, but confronting a child who is not able 
to fully appreciate the gravity of their actions is unlikely to provide the 
spiritual healing the victim seeks.  
In light of the often-competing interests of victims’ rights and juveniles’ 
rights, and in the spirit of Miller and Montgomery’s emphasis on 
rehabilitation, victims’ families and juvenile offenders alike would be better 
served by a restorative justice model. Restorative justice is an alternative 
criminal justice model that may serve as a replacement for or supplement to 
the traditional penological system. It typically involves significant 
interaction between an offender and their victim, often with the aid of a 
trained mediator.122 The main goal of restorative justice is that the offender 
accept responsibility for the harm they have caused to the victim and 
community and attempt to make amends for that harm, often through some 
 
119.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010). 
120.  See generally Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of 
Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419 (2003). 
121.  See Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive Versus 
Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107 (2009). The author notes that the 
“juxtaposition of victim impact statements against inadequate apologies by young offenders exacerbates 
the risk that judges will impose purely or primarily retributive sentences at disposition. Power 
differences between immature youth on the one hand and articulate or well-coached victims on the other 
often produce imbalanced advocacy.” Id. at 1144.   
122.  Practice Profile: Restorative Justice Programs for Juveniles, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 
https://www.crimesolutions.gov/PracticeDetails.aspx?ID=70 [https://perma.cc/Z9H4-B8KN]. 
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form of community service.123 In turn, this allows the victim to achieve 
some measure of healing and in turn offer forgiveness to the offender.124 
When a juvenile offender has the opportunity to work through the 
difficult process of being confronted with the pain they caused to the family 
of their victim with proper support and therapeutic tools, they are more 
likely to process those emotions in a healthy, constructive way that leads to 
contrition and genuine rehabilitation.125 Furthermore, victims who work 
closely with offenders in restorative justice settings are more likely to 
experience healing and satisfaction than those who only confront the 
offender in the courtroom during a sentencing hearing.126 
Most states have not implemented a restorative justice program, at least 
not for homicide and other serious crimes, and they are unlikely to do so in 
the near future. What then can states do to comport with the Miller and 
Montgomery decisions within existing sentencing practices? Many states 
have chosen to eliminate JLWOP as a punishment altogether, which some 
scholars see as the most logical solution.127 States that currently do not 
provide statutory aggravating factors in their JLWOP sentencing statutes128 
and those that explicitly allow impact testimony129 should, at a minimum, 
rewrite their statutes to require consideration of the defendant’s capacity for 
rehabilitation or the presence of irreparable depravity. They should also 
explicitly prohibit the consideration of non-defendant-focused factors such 




The Court’s mandate that JLWOP only be assigned to juveniles who are 
entirely incapable of rehabilitation focuses the sentencing decision solely 
on the juvenile defendant. It thus renders outside factors like victim and 
community impact irrelevant for sentencing purposes. Furthermore, impact 
testimony serves little penological purpose but has the potential to result in 
 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. 
125.  See Buckingham, supra note 117, at 859. 
126.  See Buckingham, supra note 117 at 875.  
127.  See, e.g., Reichman Hoesterey, supra note 92, at 185. 
128.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209A (2019). 
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arbitrary sentencing. Victim involvement is best when limited to restorative 
justice programs. 
As states strive to rewrite their sentencing statutes to comport with 
Miller and Montgomery, those with impact testimony enumerated in their 
discretionary or mandatory aggravating factors should remove them, and 
those states lacking statutory aggravating factors altogether should 
explicitly prohibit the use of impact testimony.  
Only with these measures will the spirit of Miller and Montgomery be 
upheld. Only then will immature juvenile offenders be assured a meaningful 
opportunity for rehabilitation and eventual release as mature adults. 
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